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sources on the American experience and the far more fragmentary secondary sources on foreign disability policy to compare America with other nations. The simple fact is that I know more about America than I do about Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, or Holland. In part, also, this condition has to do with the broad scope of time covered by this essay. Generalizations about comparative social policy in the late nineteenth century may not apply to social policy after W orld W ar II. I find an extreme divergence between America and Great Britain and America and Sweden in the post-World War II era, rather than before.
For all the care that must be taken with making broad generali zations, nations do emulate one another in conceptualizing and some times implementing social policies. For example, American social insurance experts, anxious to make their proposals appear legitimate, have copied notions, such as the very idea o f social insurance, and specific programs, such as workers' compensation, from their foreign counterparts. American advocates for the handicapped have taken proposals, such as quotas in hiring, directly from western European models.
American experts have attempted to learn from foreign experience as well as from foreign ideas. Because American programs have fol lowed upon the adoption o f similar programs in Europe, American experts have drawn on a tangible body o f foreign administrative ex perience, rather than borrowing theoretical constructs alone. These experts have also tried to modify foreign programs in an effort to improve, rather than merely transplant, them.
Lessons learned from an international community o f experts and advocates have acquired a particularly American cast as a result of domestic politics. More than experts and advocates are involved in the policy process, after all. Others with a legitimate claim on the policy-making process, such as legislators, have modified foreign proposals.
Disability policy, in other words, is largely the result o f the same historical and structural forces that have shaped American social policy more generally. This is not the place to define those forces, yet certain factors carry particular weight in explaining the differences between American and European disability policy. It mattered, for example, that America, unlike most other countries, tried to institute a social insurance program in the Depression, rather than in a more prosperous era.
Significant American structural forces, not present to the same degree in the other countries considered here, included the tradition of relying on states and courts, rather than the federal government, to design and carry out social policies. In part, that practice stemmed from conscious constitutional design, but in part it reflected a more general vision o f government as an agent resolving disputes between private parties. Also, democratic pressures cancelling out opposing views and a lack o f administrative capacity have created a void that the courts have filled (Skowronek 1982) . N ot surprisingly, then, much of our disability policy has flowed from the courts, rather than from Congress.
A final dimension o f politics needs to be mentioned. Our politics is inevitably bureaucratic, and at any given time there is no one version of the American state, but rather a series o f departments and other bureaucratic entities, each with its own aspirations (Quadagno 1988).
Although I recognize that bureaucratic politics is universal, I choose to emphasize American bureaucratic politics within the executive branch o f the federal government. That reflects my use o f international comparison as a means o f illuminating American, rather than foreign, disability policy.
The First Programs: Partial Emulation of Great Britain and Germany
Whatever the reason, disability has never been the primary risk covered by a major social insurance program. Instead, it has functioned as an appendage o f other programs. If modern social policy can be said to date from the establishment o f national social insurance laws in Germany between 1883 and 1889, then the notion of disability as a secondary risk goes back to the very beginnings o f the modern era (Heclo 1974 ).
The earliest commentators on social insurance in America noted that disability always stemmed from another social welfare problem, such as the aging process or the progress o f a specific disease or injury.
Isaac Rubinow, the Russian immigrant generally considered to be America's greatest authority on social insurance in its early years, wrote that a person could take three routes to disability. He could be born with a disability. He could also take what might be described as the " pre-old" route, such as by doing heavy labor and breaking down, or he could take the " sickness" route, getting a disease that left him incapacitated. Rubinow specifically cited European social insurance experts who pointed out that "permanent impairment" could come from the " after effects o f sickness or accidents" or from "advanced age" (Rubinow 1916) . It followed, then, that disability was not a distinctive social risk but could instead be handled through extension o f the social provisions for education, health insurance, work accidents, and old age.
W hen Germany passed the first national social insurance laws in the 1880s, that country institutionalized the notion o f disability as a secondary risk. There were two important links between the social insurance system and disability. Health insurance, best thought of as temporary sickness insurance because o f its emphasis on the payment o f cash benefits, included a short-term cash grant to cover income lost during illness. After twenty-six weeks, this grant could be con verted to a temporary " sickness pension." The technical definition of this pension mentioned people who were " not confirmed invalids" but who were " unfit for work during an entire year" (section 10 of the 1889 " Act for Insurance Against O ld Age and Invalidity," quoted in Brooks [1895, 168] ). Old age insurance also contained an " invalidity" clause that allowed a person to take what we would now call early retirement if he could not earn one-third o f his previous wages (Falk 1936) .
From the beginning the Germans were able to isolate candidates for rehabilitation, prim arily am ong people receiving the "sickness pensions". The authorities recognized that a m edical or vocational intervention could prevent a sick person from crossing over the line from temporary to perm anent d isab ility and thus save the G erm an Significantly, these institutions focused on younger workers m ak in g the transition from tem porary to total d isab ility, rather than older workers nearing retirem ent. The G erm ans understood that rehabili tation functioned more effectively am ong the young rather than the old. In the old-age insurance program , for exam ple, the d isab ility emphasis was on retirem ent. A person could g e t regular old-age benefits at the age o f 7 0 , bu t benefits were payable to younger people on the basis o f " in valid ity ," or a reduction in earning capacity. B y 1908, in fact, the overw helm ing num ber o f people on the rolls g o t there on the basis o f invalidity rather than old age. O f 1 4 0 ,0 0 0 pensions granted in the G erm an system in 1908, only 1 1 ,0 0 0 were for normal old age; 1 1 7 ,0 0 0 were for perm anent invalidity and 1 2 ,0 0 0 for sickness (R ubinow 191 6 , 358) .
When the B ritish Parliam ent passed Lloyd G eorge's act in 1911 covering unem ploym ent and health insurance, it follow ed the G erm an example and united paym ent for health services and cash benefits within one program . T h e B ritish system , like the G erm an system , emphasized the paym ent o f cash benefits rather than the provision o f medical care. In the B ritish schem e, a worker could receive cash sickness benefits for 2 6 w eeks, after which he becam e eligib le for a "disablem ent" benefit (G ilb ert 1970; G re g g 1967) . A pparently, how ever, the British showed less interest in establishin g a rehabilitation link in their social insurance system . (Heclo 1974, 68-69) .
In particular, American legislators accepted the British practice of combining benefits for temporary and permanent disability and for uniting health service and income maintenance benefits within one social insurance program. The Americans also used somewhat similar institutions to administer their laws. Where the British depended on friendly societies and industrial life insurance companies, the Amer icans utilized property and casualty insurance companies. By 1920, American workers' compensation programs, although they operated on the state level, covered most o f the nation's workers. Most states began only with monetary benefits, but by 1935, 23 states had legislated unlimited medical care for injured workmen. Limited to work-related injuries, the American workers' compensation laws nonetheless generated 77 million dollars in medical expenses by the 1930s (Falk 1936, 291, 298) The New Deal, Depression Politics, and American Social Insurance
During the New Deal, America added old-age insurance and un employment insurance to its array o f social insurance programs. In time, American policy makers augmented each o f these programs by giving them disability features: a disability pension in the old-age insurance program (1956) and, in at least five states, a sickness benefit in the unemployment insurance program (except, in New York, which linked the sickness benefit with its workers' compensation program).
In creating social insurance programs in the New Deal period and in extending those programs to cover disability, American officials provide an annuity to retired workers. This contributory annuity would provide the base on which a disability pension would eventually be built. The committee's staff soon discovered the difficulties of starting such a program during a depression. Plans to create a system that was self-financing were overshadowed by noncontributory pro grams in aid o f groups, such as the elderly, considered worthy of immediate federal financial assistance.
In 1935, as Congress prepared to consider the Social Security Act, workers' compensation illustrated what could go wrong, rather than what was right, with social insurance programs. The notion of workers' compensation as a failed program became a matter o f faith among the public health technicians, actuaries, pension experts, and academ ics who advised the government on the Social Security program. After 1935, many o f these same people became mid-level government bu reaucrats who designed amendments to the Social Security program. Their critique o f workers' compensation centered on its feilure to end litigation and on the political way in which its benefits were awarded.
Analysts, the public health experts and lawyers who were not immediately affected by changes in compensation costs and therefore considered themselves to be impartial in their assessment, regarded state workers' compensation programs as too political. Employers had obvious reasons to understate the extent o f a worker's disability and to provide the employee with shoddy medical care. Incompetent or cormpt administrators allowed the employers to get away with it. "In the choice o f doctors many or most o f the companies have been far more interested in the cheapness o f the professional work than in its quality or effectiveness from the point o f view o f the injured employee,'' wrote public health expert I.S. Falk (1936, 307) . In the state o f Illinois, the officials appointed to hear disputed compensation cases spent most o f their time " keeping their political fences intact,'' noted legal expert Walter Dodd (1936) To an American student o f social insurance, the foreign experience contained a cautionary note that was not unlike the lesson that could be learned from workers' compensation. What started as a limited and controlled program o f unemployment insurance in Britain soon mushroomed into an uncontrollable and widely dispersed dole. Pol iticians, fliced with unrest among the unemployed, could not resist extending coverage and benefits and permitting the government, rather than the employers or employees, to assume the increased costs. (The experience with American Civil W ar pensions could be read in somewhat the same way.) Further, people responded rationally to the incentives built into the social insurance programs. If the benefits were higher on unemployment than on sickness benefits, as they were in the British system after 1921, a disabled person might well prefer to switch to the more liberal system. Even the less generous sickness benefit system was subject to charges that its rolls contained ma lingerers. " Malingering clearly grew as unemployment grew worse," for reasons that had to do, in part, with the administrative design o f the sickness benefit program (Gilbert 1970) . The moral o f this tale was clear; much attention needed to be lavished on administrative design o f a social insurance program, particularly the parts of it concerned with disability. Democrats and Republicans to qualify for relief, and the result is that they are all joining up with this radical party in order to get relief' (Knutson, 1935, 130) .
Planners, the congressmen believed, placed abstract theory above social necessity. Politicians regarded the attempt to begin self-financed social insurance programs during a deep depression as a perfect ex ample. Congressman Ernest Lundeen, the author of a radical alter native to the Social Security Act, could ridicule the social planners in the Roosevelt administration by pointing out that the legislation emphasized eventual, rather than immediate benefits. Lundeen por trayed the administration's position as follows: " W e will not do any thing for the aged now. W e will not permit you to help the aged today or tomorrow or this year or next year. W e will think about doing something for them several years from now. I say to the Mem bers o f the House that you will face the voters in 1936, and these aged people will rise up in your audiences and demand from you, 'What did you do to bring us adequate, genuine old-age pensions in the Seventy-fourth Congress.^' " {Congressional Record 1935, 5962).
The planners hoped to create a system that would, in effect, defeat what they regarded as the politicians' worst instincts. 'The planners' strategy included proposals for nonpartisan administration through a social insurance board containing representatives o f both parties, for federal supervision o f local social welfare programs and complete fed eral control o f old-age insurance, for the creation o f a self-financed old-age insurance program that would not depend on politically sen sitive and easily manipulated general revenues, and for a system o f financial accounting in which the future liabilities o f the system were always visible to current policy makers. The hopes were, therefore, for administrative competence and financial prudence.
In the minds o f the experts who considered themselves removed from the pressures o f partisan politics, the congressional debate over the Social Security Act confirmed the need to remove the American social welfare program from political or popular forces. As expected.
Congress paid almost no attention to old-age insurance. Instead, leg islative debate reflected the strong desire on the part o f the states and Asked about including the blind in the Social Security Act by a congressional committee, Edwin W itte argued that no special leg islation was necessary. He said that the blind fared better than any other group o f impaired individuals, because they had already made an effective appeal to the " sympathies o f the public." Although Witte (1935, I l4 ) did not rule out federal aid to the blind, he urged that others affected by the Depression come first.
The blind's special standing in American policy accounted both for W itte's argument that the blind were relatively well oflf and for Congress's special attention to the blind. 'The lack o f stigma associated with blindness, the relative ease with which people could imagine and hence fear the state o f blindness, and the long history of blindness all contributed to that special standing. So did the very fact that blindness was less disabling than other impairments (Berkowitz 1987) . Defeated in the House, the advocates for the blind tried the Senate. The Senate Finance Committee inserted grants to the blind in the bill. Senator Pat Harrison (D-Mississippi), the committee chairman, noted that the sight o f several old blind men being led into the committee hearing room by their dogs " moved" the committee {Congressional Record 1935, 9269). The committee reported to the Senate that only 15 percent o f the blind were employed and argued that the need for financial assistance outweighed the blind's need for rehabilitation. "Social work among the blind is important, but their greatest need, particularly among those in the older age groups, is actual financial assistance," the committee stated (U.S. Senate Finance Committee 1935, 22) .
The measure passed the Senate with no opposition, and the House concurred in the conference committee. When the congressman who had pressed the case for the blind in the House returned from the conference committee, he told his fellow representatives in partisan political language aimed at the Democrats that the " brain trusters" had tried to push aside the blind but had failed. The congressmen thanked the conferees on " behalf o f the thousand o f poor blind who must grope their way through a dark world" {Congressional Record 1935, 11327). In this way, aid to the blind became an established part o f American social policy.
Great Britain, it might be added, had similar legislation on behalf of the blind. The Blind Persons Act o f 1920 provided for a register of blind people, a welfare grant to blind people over the age o f 40, and a loose program o f local assistance to the blind that included sheltered workshops and training centers. Although no evidence sug gests that the countries copied one another, the blind became a special class o f citizen in both countries, entitled to aid from the state (Beveridge 1942) . In both countries, social planners complained o f this practice but to little avail.
Divergence after the New Deal
In the period after 1935, the American and European experience with disability policy diverged significantly. In the first place, the British took steps to integrate their health insurance, unemployment, and old-age insurance programs and to expand coverage and benefits. In the second place, some o f the European countries, such as Holland and Sweden, developed manpower programs designed to minimize stmctural unemployment and aid in the creation o f a full-employment economy. The politics o f temporary disability in America were entangled with the efiforts by Social Security administrators to pass the WagnerMurray-Dingell bill during and after the war. Although this federal social insurance plan, first introduced in 1943, never came close to passage, it contained an important piece o f disability policy that reflected lessons American planners had learned from British health insurance programs. The Americans believed that, by combining health insurance and cash disability benefits, the British had made a mistake: Doctors who both treated patients and certified disability exaggerated the severity o f sickness and the duration o f disability. In this manner, they encouraged malingering and raised the costs o f the program. As a result, American planners concluded that cash benefits should be separated from the provision o f medical care. In America, unlike Britain, the same doctor would not be allowed both to treat a patient's illness and certify his eligibility for cash benefits.
Because o f the American planners' reading o f the British experience, they wanted to separate health insurance and disability insurance and to link disability with other forms o f income maintenance. They decided to include temporary disability benefits as part of unem ployment compensation and permanent disability benefits as part of old-age insurance. Unemployment and temporary disability paid tem porary benefits; old-age insurance and permanent disability insurance paid permanent benefits. Unemployment was a state program; oldage insurance was a federal program. 1949 the notion o f a federal temporary disability law mustered nearly no political support. In that year, Mary Donlon, the New York state workers' compensation administrator who had been put in charge of that state's new temporary disability law, lectured Congress on the " disturbing tendency in the field o f industrial relations to fiivor the substitution o f stateism, through political action, for the process of collective bargaining.' ' Donlon (1949 ' Donlon ( , 2253 asserted that such an approach led to the " eventual liquidation o f labor organizations" and that the New York State approach which permitted private parties " the widest latitude" was superior.
This reliance on localities and private parties to cover the risk of temporary disability-^so divergent horn what happened in postwar Britain-related to the American approach toward the rehabilitation o f the disabled. Simply put, other countries, such as Holland, main tained better bridges between temporary and permanent disability. In Holland's more integrated system, one that was influenced by the Beveridge report (Emanuel, Halberstadt, and Peterson 1984) , trade associations administered both temporary and permanent disability benefits. A t the end o f a year o f sickness benefits, the beneficiary's trade association automatically prepared an application for permanent Faced with this sort o f criticism, the Social Security officials beat a tactical retreat from programs that emphasized employment, social services, or rehabilitation and concentrated instead on income main tenance and retirement. Although many o f these officials, such as Arthur Altmeyer, had begun their careers in state government, they grew increasingly distrustful o f the states' motives and competence. In 1940, when the first disability plans were being put together, federal planners stated that one o f the major purposes o f a social insurance program against disability was to supply occupational re training to persons with chronic impairments. Legislation prepared by the Social Security Board in 1940 (but not passed) included a 1400,0000 appropriation for " medical, surgical, rehabilitation, and other services to disabled beneficiaries." " Rehabilitation," claimed the Social Security Board, " is in the interest not only o f the worker but also o f the insurance system" (Falk 1940) . As it became clearer that the federal government would administer only a program for the permanently and totally disabled, with few ties to the widely dispersed state programs for temporary disability, and with active hostility from other federal officials running manpower programs. Social Security officials lost interest in the notion o f rehabilitation. In time, the Social Security Administration wanted nothing to do with any form o f manpower program designed to eliminate or forestall unemployment. W hen, for example, the idea o f combining manpower and income maintenance programs resurfaced in the 1960s, Social Security officials insisted on a strict separation o f cash benefits and services. After Congress passed a law that emphasized the rehabili tation o f welfare beneficiaries in 1962, Social Security officials sup ported the creation o f a separate " Welfare Administration" to ad minister the service end o f the law. The resulting lack of cooperation placed considerable strain on efforts to link income maintenance and rehabilitation (W inston 1963). In 1969 the Social Employment Act combined the older programs for manual and white-collar workers into one consolidated, complex, and heavily regulated program. By 1976 this program maintained 64,000 workers (1.5 percent o f total Dutch employment) (Haveman 1979) . Even as economists calculated that due to the large costs and low productivity o f such a program it represented a net social cost This failure o f the disab ility insurance program to effect rehabili tation should not be surprisin g; in B ritain and H ollan d, after all, few of the permanently disabled went back to w ork. In those countries, however, other routes tow ard disab ility , in particular the health insurance system , increased the usefulness o f em ploym ent and reha bilitation measures. In Sweden and H ollan d, also, the governm ent tolerated costly subsidized em ploym ent program s. T he state w as, in other words, w illing to pay for the em ploym ent o f the handicapped.
In America, by way o f contrast, work-fare program s gained proponents not only because o f the presum ed psychic benefits o f work bu t also because these program s prom ised to save m oney in the long run.
In the postwar era, the private sector rem ained im portant in A m er ican d isab ility policy. O ne-quarter o f A m erica's welfare expenditures in the 1970s were m ade by nonpublic institutions. Although health care con stituted the prim ary private expenditute, private employers also paid for sick leave and tem porary disability programs. Private pensions even supplem ented the income o f nearly one-half of the recipients o f pu b lic d isab ility benefits (Stevens 1988 ).
T h e costs o f these private endeavors motivated social action. As the costs o f short-term disab ility rose to between 2 and 4 percent of payroll, the sam e business coalitions that were created to help private em ployers w ith the m anagem ent o f health care costs took an interest in controlling d isab ility costs. W ith the aid o f these coalitions, em ployers initiated program s known as " disability management at the w orkplace." Com ponents o f these program s included a grab bag of health care, psychological counselling, management planning, and ergonom ic techniques too diverse to characterize. D isability manage m ent could include early identification o f job-related disability prob lem s, planned m anagem ent o f disability-related costs, the willingness to m odify jobs, and developm ent o f personnel policies to facilitate work return and job retention for the injured, disabled, or chronically ill worker (Carbine and Schwartz, 1987) . T he concept im plied a coordinated disability policy, with many of the sam e linkages that characterized the European system and, no dou bt, w ith m any o f the sam e biueaucratic problem s. Most American com panies, for exam ple, have not designated a "disability benefits m an ager" nor created a cohesive structure to unite workers' compen sation benefits, health care coverage, and work-place modification (Carbine and Schwartz 1987) .
A t the sam e tim e, disability m anagem ent reflects American rather than European traditions. Corporate officials involved in disability m anagem ent speak the langu age o f human capital investment, a lan g u ag e that goes back at least as fiir as the welfere capitalism of the 1920s. A s an officer o f 3M pu ts it, "Ju s t as we strive to maximize our return on our m aterial resources, it is also our policy to maximize the contribution o f our hum an resources" (Carbine and Schwartz 1987; Berkow itz and M cQ uaid 1988) . Som e unions react to this sort of rhetoric w ith the sam e sort o f caution that characterized labor's reaction to scientific m anagem ent and welfare capitalism . The object, after all, is to reduce rhe cost o f fringe benefits through such devices as mod ifying seniority rules and p erm ittin g handicapped individuals to work.
Even disability m anagem ent at the w orkplace, for all o f its reliance on private initiative, depends on crucial linkages between the public and private sectors. T o cite just one exam ple, a worker cannot retire on a private, permanent disability pension unless he also applies for a Social Security disability benefit. T hat means that the private sector uses the public sector to preserve a strict definition o f disab ility and to pay part o f the cost o f perm anent disability pensions.
These 
Conclusion; The Consequences
T h is essay has dem onstrated the emergence o f distinctive American in stitution s, such as disability m anagem ent at the workplace, even in the face o f H eclo's " international context o f communication and policy developm ent" that has brought such ideas as quotas or a national system o f social insurance across the A tlantic. I f one avoids the temp tation to becom e a " dispenser o f moral ju dgm en ts," one still cannot escape the fact that history has consequences, as the following hy pothetical com parison o f a thirty-year-old Swedish worker and an A m erican worker who become disabled reveals.
W hat happens to these workers as a consequence o f the institutions that have developed over time.^ First, the Swedish worker receives cash sickness benefits, and social assistance (if his income is low enough), along w ith m edical care. Later, the authorities give the worker a m ore perm anent assignm ent or classification. Although the severely disabled g e t perm anent disab ility pensions, the expectation for many people, particularly young people, is that the disability will be only tem porary in duration. For these people, such as the thirty-year-old worker, the country m akes available a wide variety o f training programs, public works projects, subsidized job s, and sheltered work shops. "It is official governm ent policy that im paired people o f work ing age should be rehabilitated both m edically and vocationally" (Haveman 1984) .
If a thirty-yeat-old worker were to g e t disabled in Illin ois, he w ould not receive a public cash " sickness" benefit, nor w ould the state or federal government necessarily pay for his m edical care. T hat would be tme in at least 45 other states as well. N o r has the situation changed substantially since 1965. T he range o f retraining options would also be more lim ited, and the worker w ould not be guaranteed a program o f rehabilitation. I f the worker were to receive a pu blic benefit, it would probably be Social Security disability insurance, unless, o f course, the disability originated in the course o f employment.
The outcome o f the Am erican worker's case w ould depend upon the policies o f the worker's em ployer. T he worker's boss m ig h t very well value the employee enough to invest in a disab ility m anagem ent program on his behalf (particularly i f he were a long-term em ployee with a great deal o f firm-specific training), and the worker's com pany would, in all probability, allow the em ployee to receive sick pay and, later, long-term disability benefits. T he outcom e w ould also depend upon the creativity o f the worker's lawyer, who m igh t very well discover a means o f recovering dam ages from a " deep p o ck et." In short, the Swedish worker w ould be more likely to depend on the state, the American worker on the em ployer and the court. Fur thermore, that has been the case at least since 1946 and is independent of the workers' relative m arital statuses and even work histories. O n average, the American worker w ould be less likely to re-enter the labor force than would his Sw edish counterpart. T he Am erican w ork er's chances o f receiving m onetary benefits conditioned on the worker's withdrawal from the labor force w ould be better than his chances o f receiving retraining or rehabilitation. T h at w ould not be the case for the Swedish worker.
The case study reflects the burden o f the com parative history that has been developed in this essay. U n lik e G reat B ritain , Sw eden, and Holland, the U nited States has not developed a national tem porary disability system , except for the state-run program s that com pensate industrial injuries. B y not developing the sickness route to d isab ility in the pu b lic sector, we have insured that our public disability caseload consists m ainly o f the " pre-old" who suffer from invalidity and that the task o f coordinating d isab ility benefits and providing employment to the handicapped falls m ainly to the courts and private employers. T h is outcom e m akes us neither a friend or enemy o f progress, to revert to the language at the beginning o f the essay, but it does reveal a distinctively A m erican approach to disability policy that has asserted itself in the postw ar era.
